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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW INTER ALIA
Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular Order
Carl Tobias*

Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Supreme Court confirmation process
exacerbated the striking divisiveness, rampant partisanship, and stunning
paybacks that have systematically plagued the federal judicial selection
process. The Senate basically ended any true debate when the Republican
majority peremptorily detonated the “nuclear option” for Supreme Court
nominees. This measure, which the Senate implemented by a majority
vote, limited filibusters regarding all judicial nominees, allowing a simple
majority ballot to confirm a nominee. The requirement of sixty votes for
cloture to end debate had supplied critical protection for the Senate
minority, particular senators from states that experienced vacancies, and
the constituents whom they represent.
One century-long practice that does remain is the “blue slip.” Now that
the Senate minority has very few protections, the blue slip acts as a crucial
safeguard. Under Senate tradition, whenever the President submits a
federal district or appeals court nominee, the Judiciary Committee Chair
sends a blue slip of paper to each senator who represents the state in
which the nominee will sit, and those senators can delay the nomination
by refusing to return the slip. Blue slip retention comprises the major
protection in the selection process for senators, especially those who are
not in the chief executive’s party. However, confusion attends the
construct’s application. Therefore, recent changes in the blue slip practice
by Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA),
powerful support for Grassley’s perspectives regarding slips from many
Republican senators, and new threats by other Grand Old Party (GOP)
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members to abrogate or change blue slips merit scrutiny. Elimination or
alteration could jeopardize the Senate’s discharge of its constitutional
responsibility to advise and consent on presidential nominees and
undermine the institution itself.
Part I canvasses the rise and growth of blue slips, which primarily
derive from the tradition of senatorial courtesy. Part II analyzes how the
practice is currently employed. This Part reveals that blue slips safeguard
the prerogatives in the selection process of home state politicians,
especially those in the minority, and that Chairs have applied the concept
rather similarly. The Part also discusses how numerous individuals and
entities, outside and within the upper chamber, have urged the Republican
majority to jettison or modify blue slips. However, their contentions are
unclear. Moreover, new phenomena—specifically President Donald
Trump’s apparent view that venerable Senate procedures frustrate
realization of his political objectives—could jeopardize blue slips. This
pressure, which mounted substantially over 2017, apparently prompted
Senator Grassley to alter blue slips. As Part III shows, that change is
unfortunate because the measure’s benefits outweigh its disadvantages,
especially when hyper-partisanship pervades federal judicial selection.
Thus, Part IV supplies recommendations for the future application of blue
slips.
I.

BLUE SLIP ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

The origins and development of the blue slip warrant comparatively
thorough assessment here. Comprehensive analysis elsewhere reveals that
the blue slip’s contours remain ambiguous, because the Judiciary
Committee Chairs have not applied blue slip policy consistently and the
practice remains unwritten. 1 Some observers argue that the idea enjoys a
century-old pedigree and results from the Judiciary Committee’s
institutionalization of senatorial courtesy 2 and that the precise effect
1.

2.

2

See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the Norms of the
Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 77 (2001);
Mitchel A. Sollenberger, The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided
Government, 1979-2009, 37 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 125, 130 (2010).

MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 143-45 (2000); Sarah A. Binder, Where Do Institutions
Come From?: Exploring the Origins of the Senate Blue Slip, 21 STUDS. AM. POL.
DEV. 1, 7-12 (2007).
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granted blue slip delivery or retention has been left very much to the panel
Chair’s discretion. 3 Across a considerable portion of the blue slip’s history,
the mechanism provided “senators absolute power to determine the fate
of their home-state judicial nominations,” but more recently the
committee’s employment of slips has diluted senators’ ability to
completely “block any nominee.” 4 All modern Chairs have expected that
presidential administrations will vigorously consult with home state
politicians before nominations and have frequently assigned more “value
to a negative blue slip [properly marshaled] by a non-consulted homestate” politician. 5
From slips’ origination in the 1910s until 1955, most senators rarely
considered them to be vetoes, perceiving the measure instead as a
bargaining chip to encourage administration consultation or to attain
closer panel investigation of nominees. Moreover, Chairs traditionally
refused to “view a negative blue slip as a [means for curtailing] all action
on judicial nominations.” 6 However, when Senator James Eastland (D-MS)
3.

Betsy Palmer, Evolution of the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and
Confirmation Process: A Brief History, CONG. RES. SERV. 8 (July 2, 2008),

4.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 125. Accord, 163 CONG. REC. S7,207-08 (daily
ed. Nov. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Lee) [hereinafter Lee Statement];
Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary: Picking Judges in the
Minefield of Obstructionism, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 17 (2013).

5.

6.

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31948.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCX2-TTKH];
Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 131.

Mitchel A. Sollenberger, The History of the Blue Slip in the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 1917-Present, CONG. RES. SERV. 25 (Oct. 22, 2003),

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32013.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC8X-FHFN];
see Denis Steven Rutkus, The Role of Home State Senators in the Selection of
Lower Federal Court Judges, CONG. RES. SERV. 12 (Feb. 11, 2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34405.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3R4-LCCU];
Carl Hulse, Lessons from a Failed Nomination, for Both Brett Kavanaugh and
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
21,
2018),
the
Senate,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/politics/ryan-boundsnomination-senate.html [https://perma.cc/V5YC-FXKV].
Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 9; see Binder, supra note 2, at 11; Lee
Statement, supra note 4.
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served as Chair of the Judiciary Committee from 1956 to 1978, he
implemented a policy that delayed nominees’ consideration until both of
the relevant state’s senators produced slips. 7
II. MODERN APPLICATION

Professor Mitchel Sollenberger posited that, while Eastland’s 1978
retirement limited the use of blue slips as vetoes, contemporary practice
depended on whether government was unified or divided. 8 When Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) assumed the chairmanship, he attempted to
reform the blue slip process. Under Kennedy’s leadership, if the slip were
not returned within a reasonable time, the Chair would ask members
whether they wished to proceed with a hearing, “rather than letting the
nomination die,” so that “[t]he committee, and ultimately the Senate, can
work its will.” 9 This approach engendered controversy and Republican
opposition, mainly because Democrats controlled the presidency and the
Senate, while passage of 1978 judgeships legislation created many seats to
fill. 10 In the 1980 elections, Republicans won the presidency and the
Senate, and Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) assumed the chairmanship. 11
Thurmond announced that the committee would mirror Kennedy’s actions
7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
4

Binder, supra note 2, at 11-12; Palmer, supra note 3, at 9.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 131; see SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 236-84
(1997).

Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Part I, 96th Cong. 4 (1979); see GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at
263, 283-84; Denning, supra note 1, at 77-79.

Denning, supra note 1, at 77-80; Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978)
(adding a substantial number of appellate and district court judgeships);
Elliot Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate’s
Role?, 64 JUDICATURE 60, 73 (1980) (finding that senators had “rarely used”
blue slips to halt nominees before 1980).
Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 133, see GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at 285-345.
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by presuming candidates unobjectionable if home state senators did not
contact the committee within seven days of receiving slips but warned that
if one of the senators registered opposition, consideration of the nominee
must halt. 12
The 1986 Democratic recapture of the Senate marked the first period
when government was divided after Eastland’s retirement, and Senator Joe
Biden (D-DE) ascended to the chairmanship. 13 Biden advised that a
negative slip would constitute a major, albeit not controlling, factor if
President George H.W. Bush had actively consulted applicable home state
politicians, but the Chair admonished that the panel would honor the slip if
President Bush failed to consult. 14
Blue slip procedures remained fairly stable until several years after
divided government reemerged with the GOP’s 1994 midterm Senate
capture and the chairmanship of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT). 15 In 1997,
12.
13.
14.

15.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 133. He even held a hearing that was the “first
reported instance since the 1950s” of processing a nominee with two
negative slips. Id. at 134.

Id. at 135-36 (observing that “Biden strengthened blue slips” and panel
scrutiny of lower court nominees during President Reagan’s last two years);
Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 13-14.

Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 13-14; Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 135. Blue
slips provoked little controversy in President Bill Clinton’s first two years
when Democrats earned unified government for the first time since
President Carter’s tenure. See Robert A. Carp et al., President Clinton’s
District Judges: “Extreme Liberals” or Just Plain Moderates?, 84 JUDICATURE
282, 286-87 (2001) (explaining that President Clinton “was largely
successful in obtaining approval of his judicial appointees” during the first
two years of his administration); Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 136-37.
Senator Biden remained as Chair and made no comprehensive, formal
announcement which changed the procedures. Sollenberger, supra note 5, at
13-14.
Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 137; Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 14. Hatch
first expressly informed President Clinton that he would demand what Biden
had practiced in 1989—only stalling when the President failed to consult
both home state politicians. Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 14-15; see supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
5
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Hatch articulated a more robust blue slip policy as his Republican
colleagues were frustrated about securing less consultation from President
Bill Clinton than they had expected. 16 In this period of acutely divided
government, Hatch permitted one negative slip to be a veto mechanism.17
The blue slip issue became controversial again with President George
W. Bush’s contested 2000 election, due to uncertainty respecting the
historical practice and the GOP’s intentions about modifying the system. 18
Despite the claim by Hatch that he was carefully matching Biden’s 1989
approach, Democrats were concerned that Hatch might alter the process to
stop one politician from blocking nominees, because the Chair admonished
that he would resist colleagues’ efforts to veto Bush’s judicial
appointments. 19 Hatch defended his procedure by maintaining that one
member’s blue slip would receive great weight although not be dispositive.
Sollenberger later commented that Hatch’s statement “clearly contradicted
how blue slips were used during Clinton’s administration.” 20 Over the
spring of 2001, the parties rigorously debated their concerns in hearings
and committee meetings but reached no accord before Senator James
Jeffords (R-VT) chose to leave the Republican Party and become an
Independent, thus granting the Democrats a Senate majority. 21
In June 2001, when Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) ascended to the
chairmanship, he said that the panel would move nominees only after both
home state senators returned positive slips and once he was satisfied that
16.

Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 15; see id. at 15-16.

17.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 137-38.

19.

Goldman et al., supra note 4, at 17; Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 140.

18.

20.
21.

6

Denning, supra note 1, at 83-84; Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 16-19.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 140. Senator Hatch’s policy was designed to
swiftly confirm a newly elected conservative President’s nominees, not a
“principled stand to protect senatorial rights.” Id. at 141.
Denning, supra note 1, at 83-85.
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the White House had consulted each of them. 22 Sollenberger found that
this policy was “a profound and significant shift from Hatch’s post-Clinton
blue-slip policy.” 23 He also remarked that Leahy permitted Michigan
Democratic Senators Carl Levin and Debbie Stabenow to curb processing
of “all nominations to the Sixth Circuit”; based on this observation,
Sollenberger commented that the Chair apparently strengthened the
procedure on slips to benefit his partisan views in a manner analogous to
Hatch. 24 When the GOP won the chamber with the November 2002
midterm elections, Hatch assumed the chairmanship again and reinstated
his earlier practices. 25
At the commencement of the 109th Congress in January 2005, Senator
Arlen Specter (R-PA) replaced Hatch as Judiciary Chair. 26 Specter
determined that he would not assess nominees who lacked two home state
senators’ support. 27 As Chair, Specter likely pursued a different blue slip
22.

23.

24.

25.

26.
27.

Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 20; Elizabeth A. Palmer, Senate GOP Backs
Down from Dispute Over Handling of Nominees, CQ WEEKLY, June 9, 2001, at
1360 (on file with author); Elizabeth Palmer & Amy Fagan, Power Shift at
Judiciary Could Be Problem for Bush, CQ DAILY MONITOR, May 24, 2001, at 3;
see Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 142.
Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 142; see Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 20.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 143; Sollenberger, supra note 5, at 21; see Neil
A. Lewis, Here Come the Judges: First the Senate, Now the Courts of Appeals,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at C3; Jonathan Ringel, Showtime at Senate Judiciary,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001 (on file with author); supra note 23.

He declared that one adverse slip would not prevent a hearing or block an
appellate selection. Tony Mauro, Estrada; Sutton on the Senate Fight Card,
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003 (on file with author); see Sollenberger, supra note
5, at 21; supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. Hatch even permitted the
committee to consider an appellate court nominee whose home state
senators returned two negative slips, which purportedly marked “only the
second known case” of this in panel history. Sollenberger, supra note 5, at
22; see Binder, supra note 2, at 15 n.53; Goldman et al., supra note 4, at 17.
Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 146.

Id.
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regime because he was politically moderate compared to Hatch and
President Bush while substantially less deferential to the President than
was Hatch. 28 Specter also sought to avoid confirmation arguments over
controversial nominees and, therefore, reviewed consensus nominees
first. 29
In the 2006 elections, Democrats recaptured the Senate, which meant
that Leahy became the Chair again in the 110th Congress. 30 Leahy
announced that one senator could block action with a negative slip, which
continued procedures that he had used across the 107th Congress and
enabled Democrats to halt some of President Bush’s nominees while the
government was divided. 31 Sollenberger claimed that Leahy’s approach
“conformed well to his partisan and ideological goals . . . [while effectively
being] closest to implementing . . . [Eastland’s] blue slip policy.” 32 Writing
at the termination of the first session in the 111th Congress, Sollenberger
asserted that practices which had governed the last thirty years suggested

28.

Id. at 147-48; see Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The Increasing Senate
Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 259, 274-75

29.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 148.

30.

31.

32.

8

(2002) (asserting that the Judiciary Committee Chair’s discretion is critical).

Id. at 149; see Memorandum from the Senate Judiciary Comm. Majority to
Members of the News Media, History and Context of the Blue Slip Courtesy
(Nov. 2, 2017) (on file with author); Senators Can Veto Judicial Picks, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 5, 2007, at B6 (on file with author).

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 149. But see 161 CONG. REC. S2,029 (daily ed.
Mar. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (contending that Democrats in the
last two years of George W. Bush’s Administration “continued to hold regular
hearings on judges and . . . confirmed 68 district and circuit court”
nominees).

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 151; see supra notes 7, 24 and accompanying
text.
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that the majority would probably “weaken” slips and predicted that Leahy
could process nominees who lacked two blue slips. 33
Despite Sollenberger’s fine scholarship, his prognostication about
Senator Leahy proved incorrect. During President Barack Obama’s first six
years, Leahy refused to move any nominee who lacked a slip delivered by
each politician from his or her home state. One prominent illustration was
Steve Six, whom President Obama tapped for a vacancy in Kansas on the
Tenth Circuit. 34 When Kansas Republican Senators Pat Roberts and Jerry
Moran agreed that Six could receive a hearing yet later opposed his
appointment, Leahy did not permit a committee vote, which abruptly
ended the nominee’s Senate consideration. 35 After Republicans won the
Senate in the 2014 elections, Grassley assumed the chairmanship and
continued Leahy’s blue slip procedure during President Obama’s last halfterm. 36
33.
34.

35.

36.

Sollenberger, supra note 1, at 152-53; see supra notes 9-32 and
accompanying text. Numerous Republicans, especially in the Senate,
probably shared this view.

Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama
Nominates Steve Six to the United States Circuit Court (Mar. 9, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/03/09/president-obama-nominates-steve-six-united-statescircuit-court [https://perma.cc/Q8G3-DL2N]; Editorial, Steve Six Deserved
WICHITA
EAGLE
(July
29,
2011),
Better,
https://www.kansas.com/opinion/editorials/article1078676.html
[https://perma.cc/P2QT-JS8B].

Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 112th Cong., 734-41 (2011);
Results of Executive Business Meeting, S. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (July 28,

2011),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ExecutiveBusinessMeeti
ngResults-07-28-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF6P-NB9G].

He required two slips. Jennifer Bendery & Alissa Scheller, Donald Trump Is in
the Perfect Position to Dramatically Remake the Courts, HUFFINGTON POST
(June
22,
2017,
5:46
AM
EST),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-judicial-nomineesfederalist-society_us_59497166e4b04c5e50256f0c
[https://perma.cc/M3BQ-C4L9]; see Carl Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges
in a Presidential Election Year, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 160, 161
9
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An important reason why Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy
required two blue slips from home state senators throughout President
Obama’s eight-year tenure was that all Republican senators insisted on
consultation from the White House before approving nominees for their
home states. If that did not happen, the Republican Conference stated that
it would oppose any nominee on whom there was inadequate
consultation. 37
In 2017, after President Trump’s election, Grassley maintained the
policy but stated that prior Chairs have made exceptions—intimating that
he could act, for example, to cabin abuse or differentiate appellate court
from district court openings. 38 Nonetheless, Grassley delayed instituting
the “reforms” until mid-November, apparently because he concluded from

37.

38.

10

(2016) (discussing how GOP senators blue slipped four of President
Obama’s appellate court nominees in 2016).

Letter from All Republican Senators to President Barack H. Obama (Mar. 2,
2009),
https://www.republican.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/blog?ID=3C52243476E5-448E-9EAD-1EC214B881AC [https://perma.cc/46AV-3LJN].

Robert Barnes, Republicans Likely to Change Custom That Allows Democrats
to Block Judicial Choices, WASH. POST (May 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/senate-republicansconsider-changing-custom-that-allows-democrats-to-block-judicialchoices/2017/05/25/d49ea61a-40b1-11e7-9869bac8b446820a_story.html [https://perma.cc/TWG4-3MP5]; Seung Min Kim,
Trump’s Judge Picks Snub Democrats, POLITICO (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/11/senate-judges-democratstrump-241448 [https://perma.cc/FLW7-YC8J]. Grassley expressly endorsed
Leahy’s concept and deployed his approach during Obama’s last half-term,
even confirming the proposition after Trump was elected. E.g., Sen. Chuck
Grassley, Working to Secure Iowa’s Judicial Legacy, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 14,
2015),
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowaview/2015/04/15/working-secure-iowas-judicial-legacy/25801515
[https://perma.cc/FQR9-Y57L]; Joe Palazzolo, Donald Trump Looks to Put
His Stamp on Federal Courts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-looks-to-put-his-stamp-onfederal-courts-1478892603 [https://perma.cc/W57N-K95X].
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speaking with home state Democrats that virtually none were abusing blue
slips. 39
Over the course of 2017, numerous Democrats exercised considerable
caution before retaining their slips. For example, Senators Joe Donnelly (DIN) and Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) delivered slips rather promptly, when
they found no compelling reason to retain them. 40 When Michigan
Senators Debbie Stabenow and Gary Peters tendered slips less rapidly,
numerous critics accused them of delay; one—the Judicial Crisis
Network—even mounted a costly advertising campaign to pressure the
senators. 41 However, both members were carefully awaiting the nominee’s
39.

40.

41.

Virtually no Democratic senators delayed hearings as long as GOP senators
did for Obama nominees in 2016. Letter from Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking
Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al. to Sen. Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/6/8/68fb5673-bf3d46b6-b60c7f8f0f1a975e/7E140B1C0A5A85F747F9E91CF69DA93E.11.17.17-letterfrom-judiciary-dems-to-grassley-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR5W-S53T];
Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein: Democrats Vetting
Trump
Nominees,
No
Obstruction
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=C4B65EE1-1BEB-491E-9FF9-5A59906B2807
[https://perma.cc/3SG6-C3LQ]; infra notes 41-47; see Harsh Voruganti,
Bending Blue Slips: What Was the Need?, VETTING ROOM (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://vettingroom.org/2017/11/17/bending-blue-slips-what-was-theneed/comment-page-1 [https://perma.cc/UT2E-4N77]; Harsh Voruganti,
Bending Blue Slips: Grassley’s Strategic Error, VETTING ROOM (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://vettingroom.org/2017/11/24/grassleys-strategic-error
[https://perma.cc/4G7G-CFP7] [hereinafter Strategic Error].

David Lat, Circuit Court Nominations in the Trump Administration: The
Latest News and Rumor Part 2, ABOVE THE LAW (July 26, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/circuit-court-nominees-in-the-trumpadministration-the-latest-news-and-rumor-part-2 [https://perma.cc/Y4JG6J9N]. For the confirmation votes, see 163 CONG. REC. S6,908 (daily ed. Oct.
31, 2017) (Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett); id. at S6,202 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
2017) (Circuit Judge Ralph Erickson).

Melissa Burke, Stabenow, Peters to Meet with Judicial Nominee Larsen,
NEWS
(July
25,
2017),
DETROIT
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/24/stabenow
-peters-meet-larsen/103972892 [https://perma.cc/48KB-DQBU]; Kim,
11
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responses to questionnaires. Quickly following their completion, the
senators analyzed those responses, convened a meeting with the nominee,
and soon thereafter proffered slips. 42
In more recent circumstances when Democrats have retained blue
slips, they have done so mainly in response to what they viewed as
inadequate consultation from the White House, and the Democrats
conducted nominee evaluations for shorter periods than those which GOP
senators undertook of Obama nominees. For example, Minnesota
Democratic Senators Amy Klobuchar and Al Franken received negligible
administration consultation about the nomination of David Stras to the
Eighth Circuit. Franken ultimately retained his slip. 43 The White House
supra note 38; Todd Spangler, Stabenow, Peters Let Joan Larsen Nomination
Move
Forward,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Aug.
4,
2017),

42.

43.

12

https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/08/04/joanlarson-nomination-federal-court/540658001
[https://perma.cc/URK65QF2].
Unlike Presidents Bush and Obama, “Trump’s White House did not consult
with Michigan’s senators.” Melissa Nann Burke, Mich. Senators Let Trump
Appeals Judge Choice Advance, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/04/larsenappeals-nomination-advance/104293518 [https://perma.cc/3CTU-RC8P];
Barnes, supra note 38; see 163 CONG. REC. S6,944 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017)
(Circuit Judge Joan Larsen’s confirmation vote).

Press Release, Al Franken, Senator for Minnesota, Senator Franken to
Oppose Nomination of Justice David Stras for Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
(Sept.
5,
2017)
,
https://web.archive.org/web/20171208022046/https://www.franken.sena
te.gov/?p=press_release&id=3753 [https://perma.cc/7XJS-42AD]; Seung
Min Kim, Democrats Take on Trump Over Court Vacancies, POLITICO (May 8,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/08/trump-judicialnominees-democrats-238046 [https://perma.cc/NR5L-WACQ]; see Erik
Paulsen, U.S. Rep. Erik Paulsen Writes: Klobuchar, Franken Impede the Path
of
an
Outstanding
Judge,
STAR
TRIB.
(Aug.
25,
2017),
http://www.startribune.com/klobuchar-franken-impede-the-path-of-anoutstanding-judge/441683303 [https://perma.cc/R64W-89LJ]. For postnomination developments involving Circuit Judge David Stras, see
Nomination Hearing, supra note 46; Results of Executive Business Meeting,
COMMITTEE
ON
JUDICIARY
(Jan.
18,
2018),
S.
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Results%20of%20Execu
tive%20Business%20Meeting%2001-18-181.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK7N-
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similarly appeared to nominate Ryan Bounds for the Ninth Circuit without
granting Oregon Democratic Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley an
opportunity to activate a longstanding merit selection commission,
prompting the senators to retain their slips. 44 The White House
analogously provided Wisconsin Democratic Senator Tammy Baldwin

44.

LWFV]; 164 CONG. REC. S568 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2018) (Circuit Judge David
Stras’s confirmation vote). Numerous Republican senators’ aggressive blue
slip use for ideological purposes prevented President Obama from
nominating and confirming many strong picks and most retained their slips
longer than Franken. Russell Wheeler, Senate GOP Used “Blue Slips” to Block
Obama Judicial Nominees, But Now Wants to Trash the Practice, BROOKINGS
INST.
(May
25,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/05/25/blue-slips-andjudicial-nominees-in-senate [https://perma.cc/QZ35-DXPZ]; see Tobias,
supra note 36.

Letter from Donald F. McGahn II, White House Counsel, to Sens. Ron Wyden
& Jeff Merkley (Sept. 6, 2017), https://freebeacon.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/mcgahn-letter-to-wyden-merkley.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UGP8-45BB]; Letter from Sens. Ron Wyden & Jeffrey A.
Merkley to Donald F. McGahn II, White House Counsel (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://static.politico.com/59/2a/f5b886e44d6ba505b1551125a32e/whjudicial-vacancy-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NHX-V7H6]; Press Release,
White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald J. Trump Announces
Seventh
Wave
of
Judicial
Candidates
(Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-jtrump-announces-seventh-wave-judicial-candidates
[https://perma.cc/6H5Z-RTLN]. For post-nomination developments
involving nominee Ryan Bounds, see Maxine Bernstein, Oregon’s U.S.

Senators Say Federal Prosecutor Ryan Bounds Unsuitable for 9th Circuit
Vacancy,
OREGONIAN
(Feb.
12,
2018),

https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2018/02/oregons_us_sen
ators_say_federal.html [https://perma.cc/P3J3-BAZ4]; Jimmy Hoover &
Michael Macagnone, 9th Circ. Pick Forces Grassley to Choose: Trump or
LAW360
(Mar.
29,
2018),
Tradition?,
https://www.law360.com/articles/1025855
[https://perma.cc/M3XPTU3H]; Nomination Hearing, S. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (May 9, 2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/05/09/ S. COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY
(June
7,
2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-0718%20Results%20of%20Executive%20Business%20Meeting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P32T-AHQN]; infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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minimal consultation by nominating Michael Brennan for the Seventh
Circuit whom the bipartisan selection commission—which she and
Wisconsin Republican Senator Ron Johnson had established—did not
recommend, which prompted Baldwin to retain her slip. 45 Louisiana GOP
Senator John Kennedy, too, retained his slip because the legislator was
“undecided” about Kyle Duncan, a nominee for a Louisiana Fifth Circuit

45.

Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Baldwin: Trump Ignored Bipartisan Panel by
Nominating Gov. Scott Walker Ally to 7th Circuit Court of Appeals,
J.
SENTINEL
(Aug.
4,
2017),
MILWAUKEE
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/04/donaldtrump-appoints-gov-scott-walker-ally-federal-7th-circuit-courtappeals/539442001 [https://perma.cc/P4WG-JYWX]; Press Release, White
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Sixth
Wave of Judicial Candidates and Fifth Wave of U.S. Attorney Candidates (Aug.
3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentdonald-j-trump-announces-sixth-wave-judicial-candidates-fifth-wave-u-sattorney-candidates [https://perma.cc/5BZU-NS8H]; see Carl Tobias, Filling
the Seventh Circuit Vacancies, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 225. For post-nomination
developments involving Circuit Judge Michael Brennan, see Sen. Charles
Grassley, Chuck Grassley: Senate Democrats Are Trying to Stall Trump’s
Nominations by Rewriting the History of ‘Blue Slips’, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb.
22, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/chuck-grassley-senatedemocrats-are-trying-to-stall-trumps-nominations-by-rewriting-thehistory-of-blue-slips [https://perma.cc/GER7-UF2V]; Melissa Quinn,

Democrats Fume as GOP Ignores Senate Tradition to Approve Trump’s
Judicial
Nominee,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Feb.
15,
2018),

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/democrats-fume-as-gop-ignoressenate-tradition-to-approve-trumps-judicial-nominee
[https://perma.cc/P7FD-7ZRA]; Todd Ruger, Grassley Moves on Judicial
Nominee Over Baldwin’s Objection, ROLL CALL (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/grassley-moves-judicial-nomineebaldwins-objection [https://perma.cc/NPN9-WGRX]; Nomination Hearing, S.
COMMITTEE
ON
JUDICIARY
(Jan.
24,
2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/01/24/2018/nominations
[https://perma.cc/7MUV-K4UU]; Results of Executive Business Meeting, S.
COMMITTEE
ON
JUDICIARY
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/02-1518%20Results%20of%20Executive%20Business%20Meeting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EX66-MMPG]; 164 CONG. REC. S2,607 (daily ed. May 10,
2018) (Circuit Judge Michael Brennan’s confirmation vote).
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vacancy, although he eventually agreed to a hearing for this nominee. 46
Pennsylvania Democratic Senator Bob Casey also retained his slip for
Third Circuit Judge David Porter because the lawmaker had recommended
several well-qualified, mainstream candidates to the White House, which
rejected them after nominal consideration and little consultation with
Casey. 47
Although Grassley collegially attempted to cajole Democratic home
state politicians into accelerating return of their blue slips when the
46.

47.

Kennedy voiced concern that the nominee was a “Washington lawyer” about
whom he knew little, and the White House Counsel informed him whom
President Trump would nominate rather than consulting. For postnomination developments involving Circuit Judge Kyle Duncan, see
Nomination Hearing, S. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29/2017/nominations
[https://perma.cc/K8DV-2Y5K]; see also 163 CONG. REC. S7,285 (daily ed.
Nov. 16, 2017) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 164 CONG. REC. S2,371 (daily ed.
Apr. 24, 2018) (Circuit Judge Kyle Duncan’s confirmation vote); infra notes
60-61 and accompanying text.

For post-nomination developments involving Circuit Judge David Porter, see
Nomination Hearing, S. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (June 6, 2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/06/2018/nominations
[https://perma.cc/GFZ7-WC3K]; Results of Executive Business Meeting, S.
COMMITTEE
ON
JUDICIARY
(July
19,
2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Results%20of%20Execu
tive%20Business%20Meeting%2007-19-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EZU6U47L]; see Tracie Mauriello, Why Bob Casey Thinks the Confirmation
Hearing for Pittsburgh Attorney David Porter Is Breaking Protocol,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE
(June
4,
2018),
http://www.postgazette.com/news/politics-nation/2018/06/04/David-Porter-third-circuitcourt-appeals-confirmation-hearing-Senate-judiciary-committee-bob-caseychuck-grassley-blue-slip/stories/201806040156 [https://perma.cc/R3JMPNH3] (allowing hearing despite Sen. Casey’s slip retention and honoring
Sen. Toomey’s for Obama nominee); Jonathan Tamari, Pat Toomey Used
Senate Tradition to Block an Obama Pa. Judicial Pick. GOP Leaders Won’t
Give Bob Casey the Same Deference, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 17, 2018),
http://www2.philly.com/philly/news/politics/pat-toomey-used-senatetradition-to-block-an-obama-judicial-pick-from-pa-gop-leaders-wont-givebob-casey-the-same-deference-20180717.html
[https://perma.cc/B8Q68YCH]; 164 CONG. REC. S6,883 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2018) (Circuit Judge David
Porter’s confirmation vote).
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committee possessed sufficient qualified nominees to smoothly process
them—as evidenced by his waiting sufficient time for the Oregon senators’
panel to recommend prospects—Grassley experienced mounting pressure
to change the blue slip procedure as 2017 progressed. 48 This dynamic was
animated by the perceived need for President Trump and the GOP Senate
majority to convince the American people that they had achieved some
policy successes. 49 Particularly important were statements by Senator
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Majority Leader, who criticized Democrats
for obstructing President Trump’s judicial nominees. He argued that blue
slips were meant to encourage consultation rather than operate as a
“blackball,” asserted that the slips principally applied to district court
nominees, and urged swift change. 50
48.

49.

50.
16

Ryan Lovelace, Inside Republicans’ Plot to Ensure Trump’s Federal Judge
Victories,
WASH.
EXAMINER,
(Nov.
5,
2017),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/inside-republicans-plot-to-ensuretrumps-federal-judge-victories [https://perma.cc/2L7N-AZ2Z]; Charlie
Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciaryappeals-courts-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/F6D8-VVG7].

Burgess Everett, McConnell Aims to Reshape Courts in Case Senate Flips,
(Apr.
20,
2018),
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/20/mcconnell-courts-judgesconfirmation-senate-537366
[https://perma.cc/3RXS-67DL];
David
Hawkings, GOP Slips Past Another Custom, and Democrats Turn Blue, ROLL
CALL (May. 30, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/hawkings/blue-slipjudicial-nominees-custom [https://perma.cc/GNZ7-28HH]; Carl Hulse,
Trump and McConnell See a Way to Make Conservatives Happy, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/trumpmcconnell-judicial-nominees.html [https://perma.cc/9YJT-MULC]; Jamiles
Lartey, Trump’s Judicial Picks: ‘The Goal is to End the Progressive State’,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
22,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/nov/22/federal-court-judicial-nominations-donald-trump
[https://perma.cc/2GSR-JU6W]; Dahlia Lithwick, Judges Over Principles,
(Nov.
22,
2017),
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/
the_never_trump_legal_movement_has_morphed_into_a_plan_to_pack_the_co
urts.html [https://perma.cc/6BPJ-X47W].
163 CONG. REC. S7,287 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); Fred Barnes, McConnell Goes
to the Mattresses for Trump’s Judicial Nominees, WEEKLY STANDARD (Oct. 11,
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Additional conservatives have criticized the blue slip process and
championed modification to speed approval of President Trump’s court
prospects. These legislators include Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Tom
Cotton (R-AR), who proposed abrogating or substantially limiting the blue
slip practice. 51 Outside of the Senate, commentator Hugh Hewitt and an
operative working on behalf of the Koch Brothers both urged lawmakers
to alter the blue slip process or nullify slips. 52

51.

52.

2017),
https://www.weeklystandard.com/fred-barnes/mitch-mcconnellgoes-to-the-mattresses-for-trumps-judicial-nominees
[https://perma.cc/6SM5-V2BL]; Hulse, supra note 49; Carl Hulse, As G.O.P.
Moves to Fill Courts, McConnell Takes Aim at an Enduring Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/us/politics/mcconnell-federaljudges-trump.html [https://perma.cc/M3ZX-45BZ]. But see Editorial, A
Hypocritical Battle Over Blue Slips, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/opinion/senate-blue-slipsrepublicans.html [https://perma.cc/DN5Y-U8N4].

Seung Min Kim, Cotton Prepared to Toss Senate’s ‘Blue Slip’ Rule on Judicial
POLITICO
(May
9,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/09/cotton-senate-judges-blueslip-238168 [https://perma.cc/AMK5-FWMQ]; Lydia Wheeler, GOP Talks of
Narrowing ‘Blue-Slip’ Rule for Judges, THE HILL, (May 20, 2017),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/334296-gop-talks-of-narrowingblue-slip-rule-for-judges [https://perma.cc/7W2S-66L8]; see Editorial,
Maintaining an Independent Judiciary Is Critical for Democracy, ST. LOUIS
(July
23,
2017),
POST-DISPATCH
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-maintaining-anindependent-judiciary-is-critical-for-democracy/article_8ecb178a-1b6e5a7a-ac21-cdd87a61a2ef.html [https://perma.cc/AQ26-ETXG].

Nominees,

Hugh Hewitt, The One Obstacle to an Originalism-Driven Judiciary, WASH.
POST, (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-oneobstacle-to-an-originalism-driven-judiciary/2017/04/11/57aa2ae2-1e4e11e7-a0a7-8b2a45e3dc84_story.html
[https://perma.cc/W5ZP-EFA6];
Fredreka Schouten, Why the Koch Brothers Want to Kill an Obscure Senate
Rule to Help Shape the Federal Courts, USA TODAY (July 4, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/04/why-kochbrothers-want-kill-obscure-senate-rule-help-shape-federalcourts/441424001 [https://perma.cc/JX4J-X388]; see David Lat, Good
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
9,
2018),
Riddance
to
‘Blue
Slips’,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/opinion/senate-judicial-nomineesblue-slips.html [https://perma.cc/E38G-SK2Q] (arguing that eliminating
17

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW INTER ALIA

37 : 1

2018

President Trump has castigated Democrats for obstructing his
nominees; 53 the chief executive publicly exhorted senators to marshal the
nuclear option and confirm Justice Gorsuch long before they agreed to do
so 54 and has expressed frustration with chamber procedures which he
seems to find dilatory. 55 President Trump’s critique, which explicitly
skewers putative obstruction, indicates that he appears to favor changing

53.

54.

55.

18

blue slips will allow Presidents and Senates to fill judicial vacancies, which
will help federal courts and litigants).

Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President
Donald J. Trump’s Nominees Face Needless Obstruction (July 10, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-jtrumps-nominations-face-needless-obstruction
[https://perma.cc/8FGEFUQB]; Diana Stancy Correll, Trump Blasts Senate Democrats for
‘Obstructing’ Nomination Process, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/trump-blasts-senatedemocrats-for-obstructing-nomination-process
[https://perma.cc/T5T72R4E]; Carl Hulse, Democrats Perfect Art of Delay While Republicans Fume
Over
Trump
Nominees,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
18,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/politics/senate-democrats-artof-delay-trump-nominees.html [https://perma.cc/3R6W-BHWX].
Matt Flegenheimer, Trump Says ‘Go Nuclear’ as Democrats Gird for Gorsuch
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supremecourt-trump.html [https://perma.cc/73KN-V5YL]; John Wagner & Ashley
Parker, Trump Endorses Use of ‘Nuclear Option’ to Confirm His Supreme
Court
Pick,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
1,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/02/01/trump-endorses-use-of-nuclear-option-toconfirm-his-supreme-court-pick [https://perma.cc/PT7T-YHYL].

Fight,

Aaron Blake, Trump Asks for More Power. Here’s Why the Senate GOP Will
Resist,
WASH.
POST
(May
30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/02/3reasons-the-gop-wont-nuke-the-filibuster-and-give-trump-more-power
[https://perma.cc/3G5V-YWPS]; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump, In Wake of
Deal to Avoid a Shutdown Now, Calls for One Later, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/us/politics/good-shutdowncongress-trump.html [https://perma.cc/7WJ9-C93P].
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slip procedures. 56 Grassley first seemed to resist calls for dramatic
alteration, but President Trump’s statements and the criticisms above
could have persuaded the Chair that modification was appropriate, despite
Grassley’s earlier statements that he would apply the policy as Leahy and
Grassley deployed it throughout Obama’s presidency.
In Grassley’s remarks on the Senate floor on November 13 and
November 16, 2017, he addressed the blue slip issue. Grassley stated that
he would “honor the blue-slip process[,] but that there are always
exceptions.” 57 He observed that the major purpose of blue slips was
“encouraging consultation between the White House and the Senate” and
that they were not meant to afford home state lawmakers “veto power
over a nominee.” The Chair stated that he would not “allow Senators to
prevent a committee hearing for political or ideological reasons.” 58
Grassley remarked that he would follow the practice which Senator Biden
set forth —a “negative blue slip will be a ‘significant factor’ for the
committee to weigh but ‘it will not preclude consideration,’” unless the
administration fails to consult. 59 Grassley elaborated that he was more
likely to honor a single politician’s retention of a blue slip for a district
court nominee because appellate courts govern multiple states.60
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

See Hulse, supra note 49; Ed Kilgore, Trump Is Going to Lose It When He
Finds out About This Obscure Senate Rule, N.Y. MAG. (May 8, 2017),

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/05/trump-will-lose-it-whenhe-finds-out-about-this-senate-rule.html [https://perma.cc/N9HB-YTFW].

163 CONG. REC. S7,285 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); see also 163 CONG. REC.
S7,174-75 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“I intend to
honor the blue-slip courtesy, but there have always been exceptions.”).

163 CONG. REC. S7,285 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017). Grassley stated that the
latter two assertions are the “least reasons not to have a hearing” and are
“not consistent with historical practice.” Id.

Id.; 163 CONG. REC. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017); see Nomination Hearing,
supra note 47 (statements of Sens. Grassley and Franken on blue slips);
supra note 14 and accompanying text.

163 CONG. REC. S7,285 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); see supra notes 44, 46-47.
But see sources cited supra notes 38, 49, 58; infra notes 67-68, 74.
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Operating under this newly clarified policy, Grassley scheduled
committee hearings for appeals court nominees from Minnesota, Ohio,
Oregon, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Washington, finding that
negative slips retained by home state senators should not block the
nominees because there had been adequate White House consultation
with both senators. 61 The administration’s decision to withdraw the
Oregon nomination on the day that the Senate had arranged a floor vote
partly derived from Oregon senators’ persistent, vociferous opposition to
Grassley’s blue slip policy; however, it was also triggered by Senator Tim
Scott (R-SC), who expressed concerns about the nominee’s inflammatory
college writings respecting diversity, inclusion, rape victims, persons of
color, and the LGBTQ community. 62
The Chair set an October 24 hearing for the Washington Ninth Circuit
nominee, who lacked blue slips from either Washington home state
senator; the hearing, which occurred weeks after the Senate recessed to
campaign, lasted fewer than twenty minutes with merely two GOP
members attending and was the most recent, relevant example of several
critical phenomena. 63 Grassley’s resolution of the Washington blue slip
61.

62.

63.

20

Grassley found that Franken’s opposition was political or ideological. 163
CONG. REC. at S7,285-86 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); see supra notes 43, 45 and
accompanying text (discussing blue slip retention by Sens. Franken and
Baldwin). For Grassley’s Wisconsin decision and Democrats’ criticism of that
determination, see sources cited supra note 45. Grassley observed that
Senator Kennedy did not oppose a hearing but was undecided on the
candidate’s nomination. 163 CONG. REC. S7,286 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); see
supra note 46. For Grassley’s treatment of Washington and Senator Patty
Murray’s response, see sources cited infra notes 63-65. For Ohio, Oregon and
Pennsylvania, Grassley said relatively little publicly but seemingly implied
that he found adequate White House consultation by scheduling the
hearings.

164 CONG. REC. S5,098 (daily ed. July 19, 2018) (withdrawing the
nomination); Thomas Kaplan, White House Withdraws Appeals Court
Nominee Who Deplored Multiculturalism, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/us/politics/trump-judge-senatebounds.html [https://perma.cc/4DLX-7UKW]; see Hulse, supra note 5.

Nomination Hearing, S. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/24/2018/nominations
Bendery, Senate’s
Out?
[https://perma.cc/HGA6-JLQP]; see Jennifer
Nobody’s Around? Perfect Time to Advance Trump’s Court Picks, Says
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dispute at once shows the deficiencies in his blue slip policy as currently
practiced and going forward as well as the intrinsic difficulties entailed in
leaving to the discretion of a single person (the Chair) the practical
application of such unclear and malleable words as “adequate
consultation” and “abuse,” which require the decisionmaker to probe the
minds of senators and the White House Counsel. On October 18, Grassley
wrote a letter accusing Washington Democratic Senators Patty Murray and
Maria Cantwell of delaying Senate consideration of the Washington
nominee, demanded explanations for retaining the blue slips, and
intimated that his investigation found the White House had adequately
consulted with the senators. 64 On October 22, Senator Murray wrote a
letter which clarified or corrected “several mischaracterizations or
otherwise false assertions” in Grassley’s letter; Murray elaborated that the
assertion that she reached a “deal with the White House to exchange three
favorable Western District court nominees for a Ninth Circuit Court
nominee chosen by the White House, is simply false,” detailed her relevant
discussions with White House Counsel Don McGahn (which demonstrated
that there was no deal), asserted that the Chair “made no attempt to
discuss the nomination process with myself and Senator Cantwell,” and
expressed “fear that the clear and intentional conflation of processes for
selecting district court and Ninth Circuit Court nominees from Washington
state is meant to conceal an underlying motivation to completely eradicate

GOP., HUFFINGTON

64.

POST
(Oct.
24,
2018,
7:40
PM
ET),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-judicial-nomineesrepublicans_us_5bd0c08ee4b0d38b587f50e6?2yj [https://perma.cc/FXC7QG9G]; Jordain Carney, Controversial Trump Judicial Nominee Advances
After Two Senators Attend Hearing, THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/412976-controversial-trumpjudicial-nominee-advances-after-two-senatorsattend[https://perma.cc/CY65-ZLLF].

Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
to Sens. Patty Murray & Maria Cantwell (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-1018%20CEG%20to%20Murray,%20Cantwell%20%20Eric%20D.%20MIller%20Nomination.pdf[https://perma.cc/8VYTXHUC].
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the well-established blue slip tradition for judicial nominations” to which
she was committed. 65
Furthermore, California and New Jersey Democratic senators have
retained blue slips on nominees for appellate court vacancies in their
states, but in these circumstances, Grassley has yet to set hearings.
However, the Chair’s application of the slip policy since November 2017
suggests that he will attempt to secure Democratic politicians’ blue slips
but will probably arrange hearings ultimately if the lawmakers keep slips
and Grassley determines that the White House adequately consulted the
home state senators. 66
65.

66.

22

Letter from Sen. Patty Murray to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen.
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary
(Oct.
22,
2018),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5017920/Murray-Letter-toGrassley-10-22-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ULR-XNTF].

Nomination Hearing, S. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/10/2018/nominations
[https://perma.cc/435S-QNJZ] (statement of Sen. Brown); Press Release,
Sherrod Brown, Senator for Ohio, Brown Will Not Support Judge Nominees
Who Worked to Strip Ohioans of Their Rights (June 8, 2018),
https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-will-notsupport-judge-nominees-who-worked-to-strip-ohioans-of-theirrights[https://perma.cc/RY83-38QF]; Jordain Carney, Dem Senator Won’t
Return ‘Blue Slip’ for Two Trump Court Picks, THE HILL (June 8, 2018, 1:02
PM EDT), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/391382-demsenator-wont-return-blue-slip-for-two-trump-court-picks
[https://perma.cc/W383-YJCS]; Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting Indelible
Conservative Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/28TT-LR9U]; Agueda Pacheco-Flores, Three Seattle
Attorneys Nominated for Federal Judgeships, Appellate Court, SEATTLE TIMES
(July 13, 2018, 8:39 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/3seattle-attorneys-nominated-for-federal-judgeships-appellate-court
[https://perma.cc/CE2S-87LK]; Sarah D. Wire, California Senators Will Try
to Block White House Judicial Nominees for the Ninth Circuit, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
11,
2018),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-9th-circuitnominees-20181011-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7YYE-7Z2G];
Ed
Whelan, Senate Judiciary Committee Keeps Humming Along, NAT’L REV.:
BENCH MEMOS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/senate-judiciary-committee-keeps-humming-along
[https://perma.cc/75HQ-BDRH] (predicting a November 14 hearing for the
New Jersey nominee); see supra notes 43-48, 61, 63-67 and accompanying
text (discussing Grassley’s efforts to secure slips and set hearings for
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III. BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS OF BLUE SLIP RETENTION

Persuasive arguments confirm the advisability of maintaining the blue
slip process, preferably as it was practiced across President Obama’s
tenure, as that was the most recent, relevant precedent. First, robust slip
practice supplies protection for the minority and ensures that home state
politicians—especially those who are not members of the chief executive’s
party—can substantively participate in nominations and confirmations.
This regime distinctly assumed even more crucial importance with the
recent evisceration of all nominee filibusters, perhaps the strongest tool
that had protected the minority and, correspondingly, home state political
figures and their constituents.
Ample senatorial courtesy, as promoted through blue slip use in
nominating and appointing circuit and district court judges, could now be
the last important safeguard for legislators and the public. Senators’
participation effectively gives them a voice in the selection of local jurists,
while it functions as a check on the President and the chamber majority by
encouraging (1) the administration to consult, and reach consensus with,
senators about candidates whom the President then nominates and (2) the
majority to dutifully respect home state lawmakers’ cogent perspectives
on the nominees, who, if approved, will serve their jurisdictions.
For example, these politicians are more likely to appreciate the needs
of their jurisdictions’ courts, the electorate whom they represent, and the
local legal culture, and the senators possess superior knowledge about the
qualities that would make excellent judges in their states and of candidates
who possess those qualifications. Senators are best positioned, if
necessary, to stop Presidents from forcing the politicians and their
constituents to accept nominees whose perspectives are incompatible with
those of the senators or the constituents. Judicial appointments will most
directly affect the people within the jurisdiction of the court, and those
persons should be able to influence choices in nominees by requiring
electoral accountability from their senators.
This protection has greater significance for appellate court vacancies
than for district court vacancies, mainly because there are fewer appeals
court positions. Moreover, appellate tribunals are courts of last resort for
virtually all cases decided in U.S. federal courts, and their rulings pertain to
Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and
Washington nominees whose home state senators retained blue slips after
apparently determining that the White House had adequately consulted).
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several states, unlike the decisions of district courts. 67 The safeguard of
blue slips is particularly crucial to sparsely populated states; they
experience fewer vacant appeals court positions, which typically
materialize once in a generation, and each jurisdiction can have enhanced
necessity for representation of the state’s perspectives on the appellate
courts. 68
Blue slip practices, especially as deployed by contemporary Senates
and Presidents, have generally operated in a constructive and equitable
manner. The Judiciary Committee can smoothly implement blue slips. The
panel merely has to retain the strictures which Democratic and Republican
Chairs sustained during President Obama’s administration: expeditiously
scheduling panel hearings after both in-state politicians have tendered
blue slips for circuit and trial court nominees. Fairness merits emphasis, as
premising the slip regime’s change on which party holds the Senate or
presidency is not equitable and could substantially increase partisanship.
Blue slip application, as practiced in President Obama’s tenure, can
also impose disadvantages, which President Trump and other
conservatives have amply criticized. 69 Particularly significantly, politicians
could abuse slip purposes through injudicious use, especially for
ideological, political, or partisan reasons. Abuse causes delay, can halt
nominee processing, and may even convert the slip into a one-legislator
67.
68.

69.
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Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2233, 2240-41 (2013); see Goldman et al., supra note 4, at 9; supra note
39 and accompanying text. They are also linked to specific states. See infra
note 74.

See Archive of Judicial Vacancies, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS (2018),
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicialvacancies [https://perma.cc/N48Q-DCZZ]. For example, the proposition that
“California judges” and jurisprudence overwhelm smaller states in the Ninth
Circuit informs the debate over splitting the appellate court, while senators
who represent Ninth Circuit states other than California may be more
attuned to their constituents. Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of CircuitSplitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1372 (1995); see 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2018);
David Lat, Circuit Court Nominees in the Trump Administration: The Latest
News and Rumor (Part 1), ABOVE THE LAW (July 21, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/circuit-court-nominees-in-the-trumpadministration-the-latest-news-and-rumor-part-1 [https://perma.cc/S4AK2ECG]; supra note 38.
See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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veto, thus perpetuating the counterproductive judicial selection dynamics
recounted above. 70 In the worst-case scenario, a single politician might
stop presidential appointments for the official’s jurisdiction. President
Trump and the GOP argue that the President is entitled to nominate and
confirm selections who reflect his political views, especially when
President Trump campaigned and was elected on a pledge to do so,
because as many Republicans and Democrats recognize, “elections have
consequences.” 71 However, little persuasive evidence exists that
Democratic members have abused blue slips in the Trump presidency as
much as Republicans did throughout President Obama’s administration. 72
Accordingly, there is minimal need for effectuating the kinds of
modifications in blue slip practices that Grassley has implemented or the
comparatively dramatic alterations that numerous critics of blue slips
have suggested. Even were there greater necessity for change, the
measures that Grassley instituted apparently lack much efficacy. For
instance, his regime leaves to one person’s essentially unfettered
discretion the interpretation and application of such ambiguous or
malleable phrases as “adequate consultation,” “exception,” “significant
factor,” or “abuse,” as Grassley’s October 19, 2018 letter to the Washington
senators and Senator Murray’s deft response so trenchantly illustrate. 73
70.

71.

See, e.g., supra Introduction and notes 16-25, 30-33. It contrasts with
unanimous consent that allows cloture to treat what can become a onesenator veto. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 15-17 (R.
XXII)
(2013),
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SD8-VK8U].

Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Doing What
He Said He Would: President Trump’s Transparent, Principled and
Consistent Process for Choosing a Supreme Court Nominee (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/said-president-trumpstransparent-principled-consistent-process-choosing-supreme-courtnominee [https://perma.cc/N77R-ZCT5]; Erwin Chemerinsky, Many of

Trump’s Judiciary Picks Have No Business Being Judges. Can Senate
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Nov.
20,
2017),
Republicans
Say
No?,

72.
73.

https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article185689663.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4FH-JSXB].

See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 57-60; see sources cited supra notes 64-65.

25

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW INTER ALIA

37 : 1

2018

The argument for Grassley’s treatment of appellate court vacancies is
unpersuasive because, for the reasons canvassed above, states actually
have more need for blue slip protection regarding court of appeals
judgeships. 74
In short, the advantages that blue slips currently offer eclipse the
detriments. Insofar as the blue slip practice may carry some potential for
abuse, the chamber should prevent this from arising by constantly
remaining alert to that eventuality while installing efficacious checks on
abuse. 75
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Short-Term Suggestions

Over the near term, the Senate could easily maintain the policy that
formerly governed blue slips. All that the Judiciary Committee needs to do
is astutely continue the regime practiced across President Obama’s eight
years in office, which is the most relevant, recent precedent. That would be
the fairest practice because the party controlling the White House and the
Senate must comply with the same policy for slips. 76 The suggested
74.

75.

76.

26

See supra notes 39, 50, 59-60, 67-68 and accompanying text. Strong custom
dictates that Presidents nominate candidates from the jurisdictions in which
the circuit vacancies arise. Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies,
89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2171-72, 2174, 2181, 2197-98 (2011); see supra notes
61-62 and accompanying text.

Kim, supra note 38. To date, Democrats have shown restraint, which seems
to be the best check. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. If they
abuse slips more than the GOP did in the Clinton and Obama presidencies,
Republicans could make exceptions. The GOP might also impose a
“reasonable time” limit on how long senators might retain slips, but
disparities in the size of nominees’ records complicate this. See supra notes
9, 38-39 and accompanying text.
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Nominees?,
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2017),
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[https://perma.cc/F4QT-Z77S]; Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein,
Explaining the Senate’s Blue Slip Process (Nov. 29, 2017),
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approach dictates conducting hearings after each home state politician has
returned slips for appellate and district court nominees. Because the
mechanism was never codified in panel rules, which has apparently sown
confusion and controversy partly because it has afforded the Chair
extensive discretion, it would be advisable to craft written strictures ahead
of the 2018 midterm elections, when the party that will secure the
chamber is unclear. This action would increase clarity and consistency
while precluding Democrats and Republicans from capturing inequitable
advantage simply by virtue of political changes.
Part I scrutinized a number of approaches that both parties’ Chairs
applied to slips. 77 As discussed above, the leaders construed the procedure
in ways that solidified partisan advantage, which divided or unified
government seemingly explained. 78 The protocol followed in President
Obama’s tenure was the most salient, recent concept which Democratic
and Republican Chairs practiced and was efficacious, so this possibility
could function well over the short term. 79 Because the potential for abuse
was the chief difficulty with that alternative, the rules should duly
prescribe cures necessary to remedy or ameliorate it. 80

77.

78.
79.
80.

https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=FBE5B7DD-252F-4519-9336-1E42377DFC1D
[https://perma.cc/LWJ7-U2NC]; sources cited supra note 40.

See supra notes 9-39 and accompanying text; see also Christina Pesavento,
Grassley Shouldn’t Allow Senate Democrats to Block Judicial Nominees, THE

HILL (Aug. 11, 2017, 9:00 AM EDT), https://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/the-judiciary/346095-grassley-must-not-allow-democrats-to-blockjudicial-nominees [https://perma.cc/NS8F-8L7S].

E.g., supra notes 9-12, 16-25, 31-32 and accompanying text; see Ryan J.
Owens et al., Ideology, Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction of
Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 347.
See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. But see Owens et al., supra
note 78; Pesavento, supra note 77.

See supra page 11, supra note 73 and accompanying text. But see supra
notes 40-47 and accompanying text..
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B. Long-Term Suggestions

The blue slip is one mechanism within a larger toolbox that ensures
protection of the Senate minority. For instance, the filibuster device
actually could help eliminate or ameliorate the selection process’
downward spiral, yet filibuster abuse has occasionally contributed to the
deterioration of the process. Therefore, it appears preferable to develop a
nuanced, bipartisan solution which addresses all of the discrete problems
that contribute to dysfunction in the appointments process.
It is essential to recalibrate the filibuster, which has proved
instrumental to the “confirmation wars.” 81 The technique had long
safeguarded the minority party, but GOP filibuster abuse prompted
Democrats to constrict it with the 2013 nuclear option, although this
measure proved to be overly stringent. 82 Thus, the construct warrants
revitalized, albeit confined, application. For example, deployment may be
restricted to nominees who lack the diligence, intelligence, temperament,
ethics, or independence for providing excellent service on the bench. This
might be realized through permitting filibusters only in “extraordinary
circumstances,” a system that operated well across 2005, while clearly
defining the precept. 83 Several legislators argued that ideological
81.

82.

83.
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protection for the minority. See infra note 84; see also Carl Tobias, Filling the
D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L.J. 121 (2015); Jeffrey Toobin, Can Merrick
Garland Kill the Filibuster?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/can-merrick-garlandkill-the-filibuster [https://perma.cc/K428-38B5].
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[https://perma.cc/XQ4H-U8A8]; see Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter,
“Extraordinary Circumstances”: The Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposal
for Judicial Nominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969 (2012); Gerard N.
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perspectives and the size of a court’s docket and judicial complement were
not extraordinary circumstances in addressing the 2013 controversy
about conducting floor debates and ballots on multiple United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit nominees. 84 The
adjustments envisioned would seemingly promote reinstitution of the
sixty-vote mandate for cloture, a determination that will reverse the
nuclear option and promises to facilitate significantly greater party
collaboration. 85
Lawmakers should astutely combine the ideas proffered above with
legislation which directly authorizes fifty-seven circuit and district
judgeships that the Judicial Conference, the policymaking arm of the
federal courts, suggested to Congress. 86 This endeavor might inaugurate a
84.

85.
86.

Tobias, supra note 82, at 126-28. But see id. at 125-27. Ideology’s proper
role is contested. Both parties premise blue slip and filibuster deployment
on ideology, but GOP use was most extreme throughout President Obama’s
years in office. See supra notes 44 and 74. Moreover, President Trump and
the Republican leadership have expressly made ideology a critically
important constituent of their judicial nomination and confirmation
processes as well as “weaponized” the federal courts, especially the Supreme
Court, by making judicial appointments to those courts the foremost
argument for voting Republican in the 2018 midterm elections. Jordain
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2018,
6:00
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EDT),
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(Oct.
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2018),
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Republican senators would be required to cooperate more in appointing
judges. Tobias, supra note 82, at 140.

The Conference premises judgeship recommendations for Congress on
conservative work and case load empirical data. Report of the Proceedings of
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bipartisan judiciary, which enables the party that lacks administration
control to recommend a specific percentage of nominees. 87 The best time
for agreeing on the solution would be in a presidential election year when
it would be unknown which party was going to capture the White House
and the Senate.
The concepts proposed would yield benefits. They will slow the
appointments process’s subversion by decreasing rampant partisanship.
The constructs would supply both parties with incentives to cooperate, to
appoint jurists who can be diverse vis-à-vis experience, ideology, ethnicity,
gender, and sexual orientation, and to grant the courts necessary judicial
resources. 88 If Congress adopts most of those proposals during 2020, that
timing would stop the parties from capitalizing on the scheme’s alteration
for partisan gain. The suggestions would realize a measure of parity
between Democrats and Republicans. For example, GOP concern involving
the nuclear option’s 2013 detonation, which essentially allowed President
Obama to marshal ninety confirmations the subsequent year, was
practically offset by his mere twenty appointments in 2015-2016, which
left President Trump with 105 vacancies to fill at his inauguration. 89 This

87.
88.
89.
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rough equivalence and the devices contemplated should reduce incessant
paybacks, a major judicial selection predicament. 90
Finally, the survey in Part I demonstrates that both parties have
changed blue slips for partisan benefit regarding appointments. 91 Because
this circumstance and the dearth of written strictures have provoked
confusion and disputes, lawmakers need to embody slip procedures in the
committee rules. That approach might increase clarity and consistency and
should keep the parties from securing unfair advantage through political
changes. 92
CONCLUSION

Blue slips have furnished valuable protection to the Senate minority
and to politicians in states that encounter judicial vacancies. Thus,
Democratic and Republican party members should follow recent slip
procedures deployed in President Obama’s years and codify them in the
panel rules. In the near term, this effort should ameliorate the systematic
partisanship and downward-spiraling process that characterize judicial
selection. In the longer term, the Senate must institute more substantial
change, namely a bipartisan judiciary, to rectify the strident partisanship
which infects the selection process.

90.
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Compelling was 2015-16 approval of merely two circuit judges, the fewest
since 1897-98, when the appellate courts had only twenty-five judgeships.
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